Defining Compatibilism

Compatibilism, or “soft determinism,” is the philosophical view that human freedom and determinism are not mutually exclusive. Rooted in early modern thought, this position has been defended by thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan, 1651) and David Hume (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748). More recently, Harry Frankfurt’s theory of second-order volitions (The Importance of What We Care About, 1988) has refined compatibilism by emphasizing that freedom consists not merely in acting on desires but in endorsing them at a higher level of volition.

In theological discourse, compatibilism presents itself in discussions of divine sovereignty and human responsibility. The central issue is whether divine determinism nullifies genuine moral agency. In the Reformed tradition, this question is particularly acute in light of John Calvin’s doctrine of providence and predestination. While Calvin’s thought exhibits compatibilist features, the precise nature of his view requires careful analysis.

Calvin’s Framework and Compatibilist Affinities

Calvin’s understanding of divine sovereignty emphasizes God’s absolute control over all events without negating human responsibility. In Institutes of the Christian Religion (II.3.5), he asserts:

“Man’s will is not taken away but turned to evil by its own corruption, and God so orders it that His purpose is fulfilled.”

This passage suggests that human actions, though determined by God, are still performed voluntarily. Calvin’s interpretation of Pharaoh’s hardening (cf. Commentary on Romans, 9:17) illustrates this point:

“Pharaoh’s heart was hardened by God, yet he acted according to his own malice, not by compulsion.”

Here, Pharaoh’s choices are fully his own, yet they unfold according to divine decree. This corresponds with compatibilism’s contention that freedom is not negated by causal determination so long as the agent acts according to their own nature.

Paul Helm argues that Calvin presents a form of “theological compatibilism” in which divine sovereignty and human agency are harmonized (Calvin at the Centre, 2010). Helm points out that Calvin denies coercion while affirming necessity, a key compatibilist distinction:

“Calvin denies that God’s decree coerces; rather, it ensures that human actions occur willingly” (Helm, 2010, p. 162).

Thus, Calvin’s doctrine of providence shares affinities with classical compatibilism in that both acknowledge determined yet voluntary action.

Points of Divergence

1. Theological vs. Naturalistic Determinism
   While compatibilism typically arises in a naturalistic context, Calvin’s determinism is distinctly theological. In Institutes I.16.3, he insists:

“Nothing happens except by God’s command or permission.”

This goes beyond the impersonal causal chains of secular compatibilism. Helm (2010) highlights that Calvin’s view differs in that the divine will is not merely a determining factor but the primary agent shaping all events. Calvin’s theocentric determinism challenges the assumption that compatibilism’s principles can be applied univocally across theological and philosophical domains.

2. Moral Responsibility and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
   Contemporary compatibilists often address the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), which argues that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise. Frankfurt-style counterexamples (e.g., a locked door one does not attempt to open) propose that responsibility hinges on internal volition, not external constraints. Calvin, however, does not engage with PAP directly. Instead, he emphasizes the voluntariness of sin:

“Man’s inability to choose good does not excuse him, for his corruption is self-inflicted” (Institutes II.5.1).

This suggests that Calvin’s concern is pastoral and theological rather than philosophical. Richard Muller cautions against reading later compatibilist concerns into Calvin’s theology, emphasizing that his pre-modern context operated with different conceptual categories (The Unaccommodated Calvin, 2000).

3. Grace and Regeneration
   Calvin’s soteriology introduces a factor absent in secular compatibilism: the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit. He argues that, while fallen humanity sins necessarily, grace transforms the will, making true righteousness possible (Institutes III.3.5). This means that Calvin’s view of freedom is teleological—true freedom is found in conformity to God’s will. Susan Schreiner (The Theater of His Glory, 1991) notes that Calvin’s theological determinism resists reduction to philosophical categories, as his framework is oriented toward divine glory rather than metaphysical analysis.

Calvin as a Proto-Compatibilist?

Calvin’s position may be best described as “proto-compatibilist”—anticipating elements of compatibilism without fully systematizing them. His insistence on voluntary action within divine determination prefigures compatibilist arguments, yet his theological commitments make a direct identification with compatibilism problematic. His influence on later thinkers such as Jonathan Edwards (Freedom of the Will, 1754) is notable, as Edwards explicitly develops a theological compatibilism based on the idea that human actions follow the strongest motive. Edwards’s reliance on Calvin suggests a lineage in Reformed thought that refines and formalizes the compatibilist implications of Calvin’s theology.

Conclusion

Calvin’s theology intersects with compatibilism in its affirmation of voluntary agency amidst determinism, but its theological commitments—such as divine agency, sin, and grace—mark it as distinct from secular formulations. Helm’s reading of Calvin as a theological compatibilist remains persuasive, though scholars like Muller and Schreiner caution against anachronism. Calvin presents a vision in which freedom is not absolute autonomy but the willing fulfillment of God’s decree. Further exploration could examine how later Reformed theologians, such as Edwards, developed and systematized Calvin’s insights.